Putting the Cart before the Horse: \u3ci\u3eAgostini v. Felton\u3c/i\u3e Blurs the Line between \u3ci\u3eRes Judicata\u3c/i\u3e and Equitable Relief by Tucci, Michael R.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 2
1999
Putting the Cart before the Horse: Agostini v. Felton
Blurs the Line between Res Judicata and Equitable
Relief
Michael R. Tucci
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Michael R. Tucci, Putting the Cart before the Horse: Agostini v. Felton Blurs the Line between Res Judicata and Equitable Relief, 49 Case W.
Res. L. Rev. 407 (1999)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol49/iss2/6
PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE
HORSE: AGOSTINI V. FELTON BLURS
THE LINE BETWEEN RES JUDICATA
AND EQUITABLE RELIEF
It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety,
that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconven-
iences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free
government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts,
it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them.1
INTRODUCTION
In the recently decided case of Agostini v. Felton,2 the Supreme
Court lifted an injunction against the New York City Board of Edu-
cation that it had affirmed twelve years earlier in Aguilar v. Felton.3
In Aguilar, the New York City Board of Education was enjoined from
sending public school teachers into sectarian schools for the purpose
of remedial education because such practices violated the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment.4
In Agostini, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, held that
Aguilar was no longer good law because subsequent Establishment
Clause decisions had "eroded" it.5 The Agostini Court, therefore,
granted the Petitioners relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(5), which states that a court may relieve a party from final
I TH FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 398-99 (Publius) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).2 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997).
' 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (the injunction was imposed by the District Court on remand re-
flecting the Supreme Court's ruling).
See Ud at 412 (holding that the practice specifically violated the "entanglement" prong
of the test established by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).5 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2008, 2017.
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judgment or order if the judgment has been "satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been re-
versed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application."6 This last clause has
generally been interpreted to require a showing that either the under-
lying factual conditions at the time of the original ruling, or the law,
has changed.7
While the Aguilar decision had never been explicitly or im-
plicitly overruled, the Agostini Court determined that the deci-
sional law had significantly changed so as to "undermine" its
holding in Aguilar.8 As the basis for its decision, the Agostini
majority relied on two recent opinions, Witters v. Washington De-
partment of Services for the Blind9 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills School District,10 which, according to the Agostini Court, had
changed the law in such a way that Aguilar was no longer consis-
tent with current First Amendment jurisprudence." In the lower
court proceedings, the trial and appellate courts denied relief to the
Agostini Petitioners because, according to the trial court, while
"'[tlhere may be good reason to conclude that Aguilar's demise is
imminent,"' it had not yet occurred.
12
Thus, it appears that in Agostini, the Supreme Court used Rule
60(b)(5) as an opportunity to overrule a decision that was not only
frowned upon by a majority of the Court, 13 but had also been
widely criticized by the legal community.1 4 While the outcome of
Agostini may be more consistent with recent Establishment Clause
jurisprudence 15 and more palatable for the legal community, the
decision, nevertheless, sets a dangerous precedent.
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) (emphasis added).
7 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992) ("A party seeking
modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden by showing either a significant
change either in factual conditions or in law.").
See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
9 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
1 0509 U.S. 1 (1993).
1 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2003.
12 Id. at 2006 (citation omitted).
13 See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(callinq for the reconsideration or overruling of Aguilar).
4 See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, The Religion Clauses: Problems and Prospects, 1986 BYU L.
REV. 337 (1986); David Schimmel, Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet: The Estab-
lishment Clause Controversy Continues, 94 EDUc. LAW REP. 685 (1994) (characterizing Agui-
lar as "controversial"); Basilios E. Tsingos, Forbidden Favoritism in the Government Accom-
modation of Religion: Grumet and the Case for Overturning Aguilar, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 867, 883 (1995) (arguing that overruling Aguilar would comport with subsequent Estab-
lishment Clause cases).
15 But see Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2019 (Souter, J., dissenting) (opining that Aguilar was
perfectly consistent with current First Amendment jurisprudence).
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The use of Rule 60(b)(5) to effectuate a change in the law to
gain relief from prospective judgment is unprecedented and raises
several questions about its procedural implementation, as well as
its effect on the doctrine of res judicata. Not only is the decision
in Agostini likely to create confusion at the appellate court level in
reviewing denials of 60(b) motions, but it also creates a paradox
for trial courts in that it may now be possible for a trial judge to
abuse her discretion simply by following a controlling Supreme
Court decision. Additionally, this decision may open the "flood-
gates" by allowing parties to re-litigate decisions that would oth-
erwise be barred by res judicata. Indeed, it now seems possible
that mere statements by Supreme Court Justices expressing dissat-
isfaction with a decision could provide a "backdoor" to re-
litigation that circumvents the principle of resjudicata.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the Agostini decision in
light of the history of Rule 60(b)(5) and recommend a strict inter-
pretation of the decision that would avoid the possible problems
of this unprecedented application of Rule 60(b)(5). Part I dis-
cusses the history of Rule 60(b)(5). Part II analyzes the Agostini
opinion in light of that history as well as the possible problems
created by this decision. Part ITl explores a less problematic ap-
proach for dealing with modifications of this sort. Finally, this
Note concludes with recommendations for interpreting the Agos-
tini decision so as to minimize its potential negative consequences.
I. TlE HISTORY OF RULE 60(B)(5)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), entitled "Mistakes; In-
advertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc.," 16 allows a court to relieve a party from a final judg-
ment or order for a variety of reasons. 17 Subsection (5) of Rule
60(b) allows relief where "the judgment has been satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application." 18 This last
'6 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
l7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect);
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered); FED. R. CIrv. P. 60(b)(3) (fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party); FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(4) (the judgment is void); FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), infra
note 18 and accompanying test; FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(6) (any other reason justifying relief from
operation of the judgment).
" RD R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
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clause was the codification of the common law standard for modi-
fying injunctions set forth by the Supreme Court in United States
v. Swift & Co.19
A. The Swift Decision
In 1932, the Supreme Court in Swift reversed an appellate
court decision modifying a twelve-year-old consent decree.20 This
decree was the result of years of litigation in a complex antitrust
suit. The Defendants were a group of five large meat packing
companies that had, through price-fixing and other monopolistic
behavior, gained an "evil eminence" in the grocery distribution
business. 21 The 1920 decree enjoined the Defendants from several
enumerated trade practices and monopolistic behaviors.22 After an
unsuccessful attempt by an intervening party to modify the decree
in 1929,23 the court of appeals, in 1930, allowed partial modifica-
tion.24 The appellate court justified its decision by stating:
Diuring the years that had intervened between the en-
try of the decree and its final confirmation, conditions
in the packing industry and in the sale of groceries and
other foods had been transformed so completely that
the restraints of the injunction, however appropriate
and just in February, 1920, were now useless and op-
pressive.25
In an opinion authored by Justice Cardozo, the Swift Court
held that the appellate court erred in granting the modification,
reasoning that the conditions at the time of the injunction had not
19 286 U.S. 106 (1932); see also Cook v. Birmingham News, 618 F.2d 1149,1151 (5th
Cir. 1980) (stating that Rule 60(b)(5) was a codification of Swtfi); OWEN M. FISS, INJUNCTIONS
378 (1972) ("There is nothing in the Rules, their history, or their commentary to suggest that the
words [of 60(b)(5)] were intended to do more than to adopt the standard evolved in Swift and
other decisions.").
20 Consent decrees and injunctions are treated identically by the courts in modification
litigation, as both are judgments with prospective applications. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 114 ("The
result is all one whether the decree has been entered after litigation or by consent."). However,
Professor Jost argues that Justice Cardozo, in his majority opinion, might have intended consent
decrees to require a stricter modification standard than fully litigated decrees. See Timothy S.
Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64
TEx. L. REv. 1101, 1111 (1986).
21 See Swift, 286 U.S. at 110.
22Seeid. at 111.
23 See id. at 112.
24 See id. at 113.
2 id.
410 [Vol. 49:407
AGOSTINI V. FELTON
substantially changed. 6 Justice Cardozo then presented what
would become the established judicial standard for modification:
"Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was
decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all con-
cerned." 27
Swift's "grievous wrong" standard became the cornerstone of
modification litigation for over a half century.28  In 1968, the Su-
preme Court added to the Swift standard by stating that modifica-
tion of injunctions was not appropriate where the "purposes of the
litigation as incorporated in the decree . . . have not been fully
achieved. 29
B. Application of 60(b)(5) under the Swift Standard
Although Swift was recognized as the seminal decision for
modification of prospective judgments, Cardozo's "grievous
wrong" standard was interpreted quite differently by courts. Some
courts interpreted this standard literally and were rigid in their ap-
plication of the standard,30 other courts, however, found the stan-
dard malleable and were liberal in their application.
31
While the "draconian" standard set forth in Swift32 controlled
most 60(b)(5) motions for modification, there was a movement
among some courts to apply a more flexible test, especially in the
area of institutional reform.33  Moreover, many commentators ar-
gued that the Swift standard was too inflexible.34 Professor Jost, for
26 See id. at 115-18.271d at 119.
2 See United States v. Swift & Co., 189 F. Supp. 885, 901 (N.D. Ill. 1960), aff'd, 367
U.S. 909 (1961) (noting that Swift had been cited authoritatively by more than 100 court deci-
sions).29 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244,248 (1968).
30 See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Am. Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803, 813 (8th Cir. 1969) ('The
Swift standard] means for us that modification is only cautiously to be granted; that some change
is not enough; that the dangers which the degree was meant to foreclose must almost have dis-
appeared; that hardship and oppression, extreme and unexpected, are significant; and that the
movant's task is to provide close to an unanswerable case. To repeat: caution, substantial
change, unforeseenness, oppressive hardship, and a clear showing are the requirements.").
31 See United States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 565-66 (2d Cir. 1983)
(allowing modification for "public interest" purposes); Penwell, 700 F.2d at 574 (relieving state
from obligations to do more than necessary to comply with federal law); United States v. Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n, 643 F.2d 644, 650 (9th Cir. 1981) (basing modification on whether inten-
tion of the parties was met); Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indus., 503 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir.
1974) (allowing modification to ensure the injunction conformed to the purpose of the law).
32 See Washington v. Penwell, 700 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 1983) (characterizing the
"grievous wrong" standard of Swift as "draconian").
33 See supra note 31.
34 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV.
1281 (1976) (arguing for a flexible approach in institutional reform litigation); Owen Fiss, The
Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (asserting that remedies based on specific legal
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example, has noted that the "seeds" of flexibility could be found in
the Swift opinion itself.35 He classified the types of situations in
which courts grant modifications under the varying interpretations
of Swift into four general categories: (1) modification to maintain
consistency between the order and the law, (2) modification to re-
lieve a party from an unfairly oppressive or inefficient consent de-
cree, (3) modification to achieve the rights of the beneficiary, and
(4) modification to protect the public interest.3 6
Indeed the Supreme Court has, in several subsequent deci-
sions, moved away from the "grievous wrong" standard, or at least
liberalized its own interpretation of that standard. In System Fed-
eration No. 91, Railway Employees' Department v. Wright,37 the
Court held that a change in relevant statutory law was sufficient
grounds to modify a consent decree. 38 In that case, a railroad un-
ion sought modification of a consent decree in which railroad em-
ployees were not required to join the labor union.39 The decree
was congruous with the "union shop" provision of the Railway
Labor Act.40 In 1951, the Railway Labor Act was amended to al-
low union-shop agreements between railroads and labor unions.4'
The Wright Court justified its decision by stating that a court must
be free to "modify the terms of a consent decree when a change in
law brings those terms in conflict. '42 Citing Swift, the Court stated
that courts have power to modify injunctions "'by force of princi-
ples inherent in the jurisdiction of the chancery.' , 43
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,44 the Court
placed the Swift test within a broader context for interpretation.45
In United Shoe, a civil case brought by the United States govern-
ment for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the consent de-
cree was designed to curb the Defendant's monopolistic behavior
and to establish workable competition in the market.46  After
twelve years under the decree, the competitive situation of the
authority must be modified to conform with changes in that authority); Jost, supra note 21 (ar-
guing that modification may be inevitable in certain institutional reform cases).
35 See Jost, supra note 20, at 1113.
1
6 See id. at 1114-15.
37 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
31 See id. at 647.39 See id. at 643-44.
4045 U.S.C. § 152 (1926) (amended 1951).
41 See Wright, 364 U.S. at 644-45.
42 Id. at 65 1.
43 Id. at 647 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)).
44 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
45 See id. at 248-49.
46 See id. at 245.
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market had not substantially changed and the government moved
to modify the decree to achieve a more competitive market.47 The
District Court, following Swift, did not allow the modification be-
cause there was no clear showing of a "grievous wrong. 48 Distin-
guishing Swift, the United Shoe Court reversed, finding that the
purpose of the modification in Swift was to avoid the impact of the
decree, whereas in the present case, the purpose of the modifica-
tion was to achieve the purposes of the decree and, therefore, this
case was the "obverse" of Swift.49
In Board of Education v. Dowell,50 the Supreme Court, by
distinguishing the role of courts in remedying racial discrimina-
tion, held that the Swift "grievous wrong" standard was not appro-
priate in the case of school desegregation decrees.5' The Court
stated that the consent decree involved in Swift was intended as a
permanent prospective solution, whereas the federal court's super-
visory role in the public schools was to cease when the objectives
of remedying past racial discrimination were substantially com-
pleted.52
Perhaps the most influential decision applying a flexible stan-
dard for the modification of a consent decree is New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey.53 In Carey, Judge
Friendly, writing for the majority, reversed a district court's deci-
sion not to modify a consent decree entered on behalf of mentally
retarded residents of the Willowbrook State School in New York
City.54 The decree ordered the defendants to reduce the population
of the school from 5700 residents to 250. 55 Notwithstanding the
Defendant's efforts to comply with the decree, several years had
passed without the population being decreased to the ordered
number.56 The Plaintiffs moved for enforcement while the Defen-
dant moved for modification of the decree.57 Judge Friendly held
that the Swift decision was to be read in light of the facts of that
case, and relied on the less austere language of Justice Cardozo's
opinion, which stated that "'[a] continuing decree of injunction
47 See id. at 247.
41 See id.
49 See id. at 249.50498 U.S. 237 (1991).
51 See id. at 247-48.
57 See id.
53 706 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983).
54 See id. at 971-72.
55 See id. at 959.
56 See id. at 961-62.
57 See id. at 960.
1999]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events
may shape the need .... ,,s8  Judge Friendly also cited his earlier
opinion in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc.,59
as support for the proposition that "'[w]hen a case involves draw-
ing the line between legitimate interests on each side, modification
will be allowed on a lesser showing."' 60
C. The Rufo Decision
The most important impact of Judge Friendly's decision in
Carey came in the Supreme Court's decision in Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail.61 In Rufo, the Court adopted the Second Cir-
cuit's flexible test, and seemingly abandoned the Swift "grievous
wrong" standard, at least for institutional reform consent decrees.
The Rufo decision emerged from prison reform litigation in-
volving Boston's Charles Street prison. In 1973, a district court
held that the conditions in the prison, built in 1848, were not con-
stitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 The court perma-
nently enjoined the Defendants from housing pre-trial detainees in
the facility. 63 After five years, the court of appeals, noting that the
overcrowding problem had not been corrected, ordered the prison
closed unless the Defendants could create and present a plan for an
adequate facility.64 The Defendants crafted a plan to construct a
new facility that specifically disallowed the double bunking of in-
mates.
65
In 1989, while the new facility was under construction, the
Defendants moved to have the decree modified to allow double
bunking.66 The Defendants cited Bell v. Wolfish67 in which the
Supreme Court stated that double bunking of inmates was not per
se unconstitutional.68 The district court denied the motion for
58 Id. at 967 (quoting United States v. Swift Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)).
59 418 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1969).
60 Carey, 706 F.2d at 969.61 See 502 U.S. 367 (1992).62 Id. at 372 (quoting Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 686
(D. Mass. 1973): "As a facility for the pretrial detention of presumptively innocent citizens,
Charles Street Jail unnecessarily and unreasonably infringes upon their most basic liberties,
among them the rights to reasonable freedom of motion, personal cleanliness and personal pri-
vacy.")"3 See id. at 373.
63 See id. at 374.
65 See id. at 375.
6 See id. at 376.
67 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
68 See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 376.
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modification, holding that the movant had failed to meet the Swift
standard.
69
Although the appellate court affirmed,70 the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Swift standard was inapplicable. 71 The
Rufo Court stated, "[o]ur decisions since Swift reinforce the con-
clusion that the 'grievous wrong' language of Swift was not in-
tended to take on a talismanic quality, warding off virtually all ef-
forts to modify consent decrees. 72 Without overruling Swift, the
Court reformulated the standard under Rule 60(b)(5) so that modi-
fication may be warranted when the moving party can show "a
significant change either in factual conditions or in law. 73
D. Application of 60(b)(5) under the Rufo Standard
The Court in Rufo was less than clear in communicating
whether its new flexible standard was to apply to all prospective
judgments or only to institutional reform litigation.7 Thus, the
application of Rule 60(b)(5) after the Rufo decision has not been
fully consistent. The language of Rufo stating that a change in
either the factual conditions or the law may warrant modifica-
tion of prospective judgments is by no means a new test for
granting relief under 60(b)(5). 75  What is new, however, is the
threshold amount of change necessary for a court to grant relief.
Lower courts have been split as to whether the Rufo standard
completely replaces the Swift standard for 60(b)(5) motions to
modify prospective judgments or, alternatively, whether the
Rufo standard applies exclusively to institutional reform litiga-
69 See id. at 376-77.70 See id. at 377.
71 See id. at 393.
72Id. at 380.
73 Id. at 384. The Court continued, "Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a party may obtain relief
from a court order when 'it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application,' not when it is no longer convenient to live with the terms of a consent decree.
Accordingly, a party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of establishing
that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree." Id. at 383.
7 The Rufo Court spoke both in terms that both seemed to limit the new flexible test to
institutional reform and in terms that seemed to cover all prospective judgments under Rule
60(b)(5). 'To conclude, we hold that the Sivift 'grievous wrong' standard does not apply to
modify consent decrees stemming from institutional reform litigation." d.at 393. The Court also
stated, "[u]nder the flexible standard we adopt today, a party seeking modification of a consent
decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree
and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance" Id.
75 See System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) (stat-
ing that it was error to refuse to modify a decree disallowing a union shop when an intervening
act of Congress made it possible); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 421 (1856) (stating that a change in statutory law was a sufficient basis for the modi-
fication of an injunction).
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tion.
Four basic interpretations of the applicability of the Rufo test
in non-institutional reform litigation have developed among the
Circuit Courts of Appeals.76 One group of courts holds that while
the Rufo Court discussed modification in light of institutional re-
form litigation, the most salient aspect of the decision was its
broad interpretation of Rule 60(b)(5). 77  Other circuits have inter-
preted Rufo narrowly as applying only to institutional reform con-
sent decrees.78 Alternatively, the Second Circuit considers Rufo as
just one of many cases in determining whether to modify consent
decrees. 79 Finally, two circuits believe that Rufo and Swift are im-
portant cases for determining modification, but that the ultimate
determination is based on equitable considerations and not case
law. 80
Because the Agostini injunction was based on public institu-
tion reform litigation, it provided little help to courts in determin-
ing the scope of Rufo. Moreover, it is quite possible that Agostini
will add to the confusion of the lower courts in determining modi-
fications of prospective judgments by its unprecedented use of
Rule 60(b)(5).
II. THE APPLICATION OF 60(B)(5) IN AGOSTINI
A. The Decision
Under Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act ("Education Act"),81 Congress provided funding for local
educational agencies to promote remedial education, guidance and
76 See David S. Konczal, Ruing Rufo: Ramifications of a Lenient Standard for Modifying
Antitrust Consent Decrees and an Alternative, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 130, 151 (1996) (dis-
cussin differing interpretations of the application of Rufo to antitrust consent decrees).
7 See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that the
Rufo decision applies to "all types of injunctive relief"); In re Hendrix, 986 F.2d 195, 198 (7th
Cir. 1993) (stating that while Rufo concerned institutional reform litigation, its flexible standard
"is no less suitable to other types of equitable cases").
78 See Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the flexible Rufo standard is applicable to school desegregation consent decrees);
W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558, 562 (Fed. Cir. 1992). (denying
modification of a commercial consent decree).
79 See United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating
that Rufo did not overrule Swift).
0 See Building & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1995)
(stating that Rufo and Swift were responses to specific circumstances); Alexis Lichine & CIE v.
Sacha A Lichine Estate Selections, Ltd., 45 F.3d 582, 585-86 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that Swift
and Rufo are examples of applying a flexible standard for different situations).
1 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
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job counseling. 82 Under the Education Act, these funds are to be
used specifically to "help participating students meet... State per-
formance standards. 83  For eligibility, a student must "reside[l
within the attendance boundaries of a public school located in a
low-income area, and.., must be failing or at risk of failing the
State's student performance standards." 84  Additionally, these
funds must be made available to all eligible children whether they
attend public or private schools. 85 Furthermore, the services pro-
vided for private school students must be "equitable in comparison
to services and other benefits for public school children." 86
While Title I provides funds for students enrolled in sectarian
schools, the statute does provide some safeguards for maintaining
separation between church and state. Local educational agencies
must "retain complete control over Title I funds; retain title to all
materials used to provide Title I services; and provide those serv-
ices through public employees or other persons independent of the
private school and any religious institution." 87
From 1966 until 1985 the New York City School District pro-
vided Title I services to the city's parochial schools by sending its
own employees to those schools to conduct programs in remedial
reading, remedial math, English as a second language and other
guidance services.88 These on-site instructors were periodically
inspected by field supervisors to ensure that the instructors "avoid
involvement with religious activities that are conducted within the
private schools and to bar religious materials in their class-
rooms." 89 Additionally, the instructors were required to keep their
contact with the private school personnel to a minimum.90
In 1978, six taxpayers brought a suit alleging that New York
City's Title I program violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment and sought to enjoin the City from funding on-
site instruction at parochial schools.91 The district court granted
the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the tax-
82 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1197,2003 (1997).
SaId. at 2003 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6315(c)(1)(E)).
84 Id. at 2003-04 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6313(a)(2)(B), 6315(b)(1)(B)).
"s See id. at 2004 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6321(c)(1)(F)).61d. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6321(a)(3)).
7 Id. at 2004 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 6321(c)(1)-(2)).
8 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 406 (1985) (describing how the City of New York
provided education to parochial students with Title I funding).
"I Id. at 407.
9' See id. at 406.
9' See id. at 405-06.
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payers' complaint. 92  Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge
Friendly reversed, holding that the program did in fact violate the
Establishment Clause. 93 In 1985, the Supreme Court, in Aguilar v.
Felton,94 affirmed Judge Friendly's ruling and remanded the case
to the district court for issuance of a permanent injunction.95
Specifically, the Aguilar Court held that New York City's
administration of the Title I program violated the "entanglement
prong" of the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.96  On remand,
the district court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the
Board of Education from "using public school funds for any plan
or program ... to the extent that it requires, authorizes or permits
public school teachers and guidance counselors to provide teach-
ing and counseling services on the premises of sectarian schools
within New York City."
97
To comply with the terms of the injunction, New York City
spent significant amounts of money to provide computer-aided
instruction and to lease sites and mobile instructional units as well
as provide students transportation to those sites. 98 These addi-
tional costs were not reimbursed by the Title I funds, thus reducing
the number of students that would be eligible to receive those
funds.99
In 1995, the Board of Education and a new group of parents
of sectarian school students filed motions in district court for relief
from the permanent injunction.100 Citing changes in factual condi-
tions and the law, the Petitioners argued that relief was proper un-
92 See id. at 402.93 See Felton v. United States Dept. of Educ., 739 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984).94 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
95 See id. at 414.
96 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court devised a three prong test to determine if
governmental action was constitutional under the Establishment Clause. First, the action must
not have a religious purpose. See id. at 615. Second, the effect of the action must not favor
religion and third, the action must not create an excessive entanglement between the govern-
ment and the church. See id. In Aguilar, it was the third, or "entanglement," prong that was at
issue. The Aguilar Court held that New York City's program necessitated an "excessive entan-
glement of church and state in the administration of benefits." Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414. The
Aguilar Court stated that "the detailed monitoring and close administrative contact required to
maintain New York City's Title I program can only produce 'a kind of continuing day-to-day
relationship which the policy of neutrality seeks to minimize."' Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970)).97 Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2005 (1997) (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at A25-
A26, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), Nos. 96-552, 96-553).
" See id. (citing statistics demonstrating that since the 1986-87 school year New York
City spent over 100 million dollars to comply with Aguilar, with the average annual cost of
compliance estimated at 15 million dollars).99 See id. For example, in the 1993-94 school year the City's Title I funding was reduced
by 7.9 million dollars to comply with Aguilar. See id.1oo See id. at 2006.
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der rule 60(b)(5).101 The Petitioners also relied on the Court's de-
cision in Rufo102 and cited the opinions of five Justices in the 1994
decision Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District
v. Grumet,0 3 calling for the overruling of Aguilar.1
0 4
The district court recognized that "the landscape of Estab-
lishment Clause decisions has changed 10 5 going so far as to sug-
gest that "[t]here may be good reason to conclude that Aguilar's
demise is imminent."10 6  The district court, however, ultimately
denied the motion because "Aguilar's demise had 'not yet oc-
curred."' 10 7 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion for substantially the same reasons.108  In a five to four deci-
sion, the Supreme Court in Agostini reversed.10 9
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Agostini majority, stated
that the law had in fact changed, warranting relief under Rule
60(b)(5). n0 The majority opinion began by dismissing two of the
Petitioner's three arguments. First, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the high cost of compliance with the injunction was not un-
foreseeable at the time of the issuance of the injunction and, there-
fore a substantial change in the facts had not occurred affording
relief."'
Second, O'Connor dismissed the Petitioner's argument that
the statements of five Justices in Kiryas Joel constituted a change
in the law warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(5). 112  O'Connor
101 See id.
102 Id. ("[D]ecisional law [had] changed to make legal what the [injunction] was designed
to prevent.") (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 388 (1992)).03 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
104 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006.
105 Id. (citation omitted).
's Id. (citation omitted).
107 Id. (citation omitted).
lo See id.
'09 See id. at 2003.
110 See id.
m" See id. at 2007. O'Connor discussed her own dissent in Aguilar predicting that "the
costs of complying... would likely cause a decline in Title I services for 20,000 New York
City students ... that these predictions of additional costs turned out to be accurate does not
constitute a change in factual conditions warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(5)." Id. Under
Rufo, relief "should not be granted where a party relies upon events that actually were antici-
pated at the time [of issuance of the injunction]." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502
U.S 367, 388 (1992); see also United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 ("The injunction
whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to the conditions that
existed at its making."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 73 cmt. b ("IT]he principal
factor in whether a judgment is subject to modification is whether it contemplates an interaction
between the activity of the judgment obligor and some other conditions over which the judg-
ment does not exercise control. When an unforeseen or uncontrollable interaction occurs be-
tween the judgment obligor and the surrounding circumstances, the balance between burden and
benefit can be disturbed. If the disturbance assumes substantial proportion, redress by modifi-
cation may be appropriate.") (emphasis added).
112 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2007 (distinguishing Kiryas Joel from Aguilar).
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stated that "[t]he views of Five Justices that the case should be re-
considered or overruled cannot be said to have effected a change in
Establishment Clause law.""13
The Agostini Court, however, agreed with the Petitioner's
third argument that, because subsequent Supreme Court decisions
had changed Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the holding of
Aguilar had been undermined. 114  Consequently, the "eroded"
Aguilar was no longer good law, thus warranting relief under Rule
60(b)(5). 115
The Agostini Court based its analysis on two post-Aguilar
cases that changed the paradigm of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind 1 6 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District.117 While
neither of these cases explicitly or implicitly overruled Aguilar, in
the view of the Agostini Court, these decisions nonetheless
changed the law so that Aguilar was no longer consistent with
them.11
8
After determining that Establishment Clause jurisprudence
had significantly changed, Justice O'Connor responded to the
contention of both Justice Ginsburg and the Respondent that such
an unprecedented use of Rule 60(b)(5) to effectuate changes in the
law, rather than simply recognizing them, was improper. 19 Under
this argument, as a consequence of the majority's decision, parties
would deluge the courts with motions for relief based on no more
than statements from Justices or speculation that a Court with dif-
ferent composition would decide the issue differently. 120
113 Id. In Kiryas Joel, the City of New York created a special school district for Satmar
children, in an attempt to circumvent the ruling of Aguilar. See id. (describing the school district
at issue in Kiryas Joel as a "response to our decision in Aguilar"). The creation of the new
district allowed the Satmar children to continue to receive special program funding. Id.
"
4 See id. at 2010.
11
5 See id. at 2017-18.
116 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
117 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
118 Theses two cases undermined the presumption that public school employees placed in
sectarian schools necessarily leads to state sponsored religious indoctrination or at least creates a
symbolic union between church and state. See Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, 111
HARV. L. REv. 197, 282 (1997). In Zobrest, the Court held that a state sponsored sign language
interpreter for a parochial student did not violate the Establishment Clause as long as the inter-
preter did not insert personal religious views into the translation. See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
Additionally the presumption that government funding aids the educational capacity of a sec-
tarian school is invalid. See Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Leading Cases, supra, at 282. In
Witters, the Court held that the use of state grant money to finance an education at a sectarian
university was not unconstitutional because the money directly aided the student and not the
institution. See Witters, 474 U.S. 488-89.19 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018.
120 See id.
420 [Vol. 49:407
AGOSTINI V. FELTON
Justice O'Connor summarily dismissed these criticisms by
stating, "[w]e think their fears are overstated.' '121 Moreover, she
issued assurances that "[o]ur decision will have no effect outside
the context of ordinary civil litigation where the propriety of con-
tinuing prospective relief is at issue. '122  Finally, she stated that
there was "no reason to wait for a 'better vehicle"' to determine
the validity of Aguilar.123  Justice O'Connor dismissed the dis-
sent's claims that this decision would mark a departure from the
"responsive, non-agenda-setting character of this Court." 124 Jus-
tice O'Connor's concern was the inequity of New York spending
millions of dollars on off-site instructional units, depriving disad-
vantaged children of "a better chance at success in life.
125
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer, dissented, with
Justices Souter and Ginsburg authoring the two dissenting opin-
ions. 126  Justice Souter's dissent focused on the majority's alleg-
edly improper reading of Witters and Zobrest.127 He regarded
Aguilar as not only a "correct and sensible decision,"'128 but one
that properly drew the line for determining the propriety of state
aid to sectarian schools. 129
Justice Ginsburg's dissent focused on the procedural propriety
of the Aguilar decision, arguing that relief under Rule 60(b)(5) was
not proper in this case. 130 She characterized the majority's actions
as simply another way "to rehear a legal question decided in re-
spondents' favor in this very case some 12 years ago." 131 After
citing the Supreme Court's Rule 44 on rehearing and determining
12 1 id.
12Id. The term "ordinary civil litigation" hardly seems to limit the scope of the holding.123 id.
'
24 Id. at 2017-18 (citation omitted).
126 See id. at 2019 (Souter, Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
127 Id. at 2021 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that while Zobrest recog-
nized there was no per se bar to public employees in a parochial school, the rejection of the bar
was based on the nature of the public employee's tasks. See id at 2022-23. For Souter, Zo-
brest's sign language interpreter was quite different from Aguilar's teacher or counselor. See id.
at 2023. Souter distinguished Witters from Aguilar on grounds that the nature of the aid in
Witters, a state grant to a student to attend a sectarian college, was for the benefit of the individ-
ual student. See id. at 2024. In contrast, New York's Title I program in Aguilar was a district
wide program teaching core subjects, thus necessarily relieving the sectarian schools of a basic
educational function. See id. Therefore, these two cases did not undermine the principles set
forth in Aguilar, but merely presented distinguishable factual situations. See id.1 25Id. at 2020 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting).
129 See id. at 2021.
"3 See id. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
131 id.
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that it was inapplicable to the case at bar, 132 Justice Ginsburg at-
tacked the unprecedented use of Rule 60(b)(5).133
Justice Ginsburg first noted that the appellate standard of re-
view for denial of 60(b)(5) motions is abuse of discretion.1 34 She
then pointed out that, because the district court has no power to
preemptively overrule Supreme Court decisions, the district court
could not have abused its discretion.1 35  That is, by ruling that
Aguilar was still good law and therefore no significant change in
the law had occurred, the denial of the motion was clearly within
the discretion of the trial court. 13 6 Consequently, the court of ap-
peals properly affirmed the district court's denial of the motion. 137
For Ginsburg, the majority's insistence that the district court prop-
erly denied the motion and passed the case up "bends Rule 60(b)
to a purpose-allowing an 'anytime' rehearing in this case-un-
related to the governance of the district court proceedings to which
the rule, as a part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is di-
rected."' 138
The Agostini decision seems to be problematic given the deci-
sional history of Rule 60(b)(5) for several reasons. First, the deci-
sion leaves resolved the question of what constitutes a change in
the law. Second, the Supreme Court has perhaps unwittingly
"bent" Rule 60(b)(5) into a tool for unhappy parties to relitigate
their original suits. Third, the Agostini Court may have created
confusion as to the role of the district and appellate courts in the
determination of relief under Rule 60(b)(5). Finally, the Court has
undermined its own credibility with an activist reading of Rule
60(b)(5) to overrule an unpopular and expensive decision.139
B. Was There a Change in the Law?
It is well established that a change in the law subsequent to
the order of a prospective judgment may be grounds for relief from
132 See id. (stating that Supreme Court Rule 44 only allows for rehearing for petitions
filed within 25 days of entry ofjudgment-Aguilar was, by this time, 12 years old).
133 See id. (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. at 11, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (Nos.
96-552, 96-553): "[W]e do not know of another instance in which Rule 60(b) has been used in
this wag").
See id.at 2027 (citing Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Corrections of I., 434 U.S. 257, 263
n.7 (1978); Ry. Employees v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642,648-50 (1961)).
135 See id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989)).
136See id. at 2027-28.
137 See id. at 2028.
1
3 1 Id. at 2028.
139 See supra notes 14, 98 and accompanying text
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that judgment. 140  There is no precedent, however, in which a
court has preemptively overruled a higher court's decision, de-
claring that the law has changed or eroded, thus warranting relief
from a prospective judgment. 141  Without entertaining the larger
jurisprudential question of what actually constitutes a change in
the law, there is little reason to believe that the "erosion" that Jus-
tice O'Connor spoke of in Agostini constituted a substantial
change required to activate 60(b)(5).
First, the decisions relied upon by the Agostini majority, Zo-
brest and Witters, did not explicitly or implicitly overrule Aguilar.
It is noteworthy that the majority opinions in neither case give
Aguilar even the slightest mention. 142 The natural surmise from
this obvious lack of consideration is that neither of those cases cre-
ated tension with Aguilar. As Justice Souter explained in his Ag-
ostini dissent, the most reasonable explanation is that these two
cases are simply distinguishable on their facts. 143
Second, the Petitioners argued that the fact that five Justices
in Kiryas Joel called for reconsideration or overruling of Aguilar
constituted a change in the law warranting relief under 60(b)(5). 144
In Agostini, Justice O'Connor correctly held that the statements of
Justices in dicta certainly did not constitute a change in the law.
145
The argument, furthermore, proves the opposite: Aguilar was still
good law. 146 The fact that several Justices called for its reconsid-
140 See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992); System Fed'n No.
91, Ry. Employees' Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642 (1961) (stating that it was error to refuse to
modify a decree disallowing a union shop when an intervening act of Congress made it possi-
ble); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421(1856) (holding
that an intervening act of Congress was grounds for modification of an injunction.); Theriault v.
Smith, 523 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that the Supreme Court's clarification of the inter-
pretation of a statute constituted a change in the law warranting modification); Elgin Nat Watch
Co. v. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1954) (dissolving an injunction against the violation of a
state's fair trade act after a Supreme Court decision held that such acts are unenforceable); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1943) (holding that injunction pro-
hibiting Defendant from using the word "cola" in the name of its product should be vacated
because of numerous decisions holding Plaintiff had no exclusive right to use the word "cola");
see also 12 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.47[2][c] (3d ed.
1997) (stating that changes in decisional law that make legal what was forbidden can warrant
modification). Nonetheless, it is clear that not all changes in the law warrant modification. See
RESATmMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 73 (1982) ("When a change in the law occurs fol-
lowing a judgment regulating future conduct that may be a circumstance justifying relief....")
(emphasis added).
141 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct at 2027 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142 In Zobrest, Aguilar is cited in the dissenting opinion approvingly, stating only its
holding as a foundation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foot-
hills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 20 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2022-25 (Souter, J., dissenting).
'4 See id. at 2007.
'45 See id.
4 In fact, the Respondents made this very argument, but it was seemingly ignored by the
Agostini majority. See Brief for Respondent at 19 n.4, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997
(1997) (Nos. 96-552,96-553).
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eration strongly implies that those Justices believed that the case
was still viable.
Third, while it is certainly possible that a court decision could
lose its viability over time as its legal foundations are eroded by
subsequent decisions and factual circumstances, 147 Aguilar was
relatively new and four of the nine Justices did not see the erosion.
Again, the natural surmise, at best, would be that Aguilar was
eroding but, as the district court stated in Agostini, its demise "had
not yet occurred."' 148 If in fact Aguilar was still good law at the
time the Supreme Court heard the case, the Court was not modi-
fying the injunction based on the law as it stood on that day. The
Court was, in effect, considering the case as if they were deciding
it for the first time. The only difference was the Court's changed
membership. This reconsideration under the guise of modification
simply allowed the New York City Board of Education to re-liti-
gate the issue to its satisfaction. 1
49
C. The Problem of Relitigation
In Swift, Justice Cardozo cautioned:
We are not framing a decree. We are asking our-
selves whether anything has happened that will justify
us now in changing a decree. The injunction whether
right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its
application to the conditions that existed at its making.
We are not at liberty to reverse under the guise of re-
adjusting. 150
Justice Cardozo's admonition captures the well-established doc-
trine that motions for modifications of prospective judgments are
not to be used as vehicles to relitigate the original dispute.'51
147 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (unanimously overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), after several intervening cases had eroded its "separate but
equal" foundation).
148 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2006.
149 See FED. R. CrV. P. 60 (b) advisory committee's note, 1946 amendment (stating that
Rule 60(b) "does not assume to define the substantive law as to the grounds for vacating judg-
ments, but merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief").
150 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
1'1 See 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2863 (2d
ed. 1995) (stating that Rule 60(b) "does not allow relitigation of issues that have been resolved
by the judgment"); RICHARD A. GIVENS, MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE § 7.85 (4th ed. 1991)
("The provision [Rule 60(b)(5)] does not contemplate relitigation of issues that have been re-
solved by the judgment ....").
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An instructive decision on this point is Fortin v. Commis-
sioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare.152
Here, the First Circuit affirmed a district court's denial of Rule
60(b)(5) in a case with a posture somewhat analogous .to that of
Agostini. In Fortin, the Plaintiffs, a class of welfare recipients,
filed a class action suit to force the Massachusetts Department of
Public Welfare to comply with federal and state regulations in ad-
ministering relief programs.15 3 The Department was allegedly not
furnishing aid within the statutory time limits. 154 The parties en-
tered into a consent decree that prescribed time limits for the De-
partment to process and furnish aid. 155 After several years under
the decree the Plaintiffs filed a motion for civil contempt alleging
that the Department was not complying with the decree. 156 The
district court granted the motion and the Department appealed on
two grounds. The Department first argued that it had substantially
complied with the decree, and second that the district court abused
its discretion by not allowing a modification of the decree based on
a subsequent change in the law. 157 The Department also argued
that the law prescribing processing and distribution time limits was
misunderstood by both the court and the parties at the time of the
decree, with the proper time limits being longer than originally
interpreted. 15
8
The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying a modification of the decree because there
had been no change or reinterpretation of the law subsequent to the
time the parties entered into the agreement. 159 The court of appeals
stated that because there was no subsequent judicial or legislative
reinterpretation of the statutory time limits, the district court would
have had to reinterpret the law as a matter of first impression.
160
Such a modification would have allowed "relitigation" of the
original dispute. 161 The appellate court stated that the movant's
request that "in one breath that the law be reinterpreted and the
12 692 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1982).
153 See id. at 792.
'm See id. at 793.15S ee id.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 798.
158 See id.
159 See Ud
'60 See id.
161 Of course, a consent decree issued here would not necessarily involve litigation as
would an injunction. "Relitigation" is used here in its broadest sense because the effect of modi-
fying a consent decree or an injunction would have the same effect. That is, the order would be
modified according to the present legal or factual circumstances without regard to the original
legal or factual circumstances.
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decree modified ... would transform the modification procedure
into an impermissible avenue of collateral attack on the interpreta-
tion to which the parties consented." 1
62
When reviewing denials of Rule 60(b)(5) motions, several ap-
pellate courts do not consider the substance of the underlying
judgment in order to discourage parties from using the Rule to
relitigate the merits of the case. 163  It is, therefore, apparent that
courts generally respect the principle of res judicata when deter-
mining the modifiability of prospective judgments. 164
While the finality of judgments should be given significant
weight in determining relief from prospective judgements, several
courts have made a distinction between private litigation and in-
stitutional reform or public interest litigation. For those courts, the
finality of judgments is more important to private litigation. 165
The reasons for this distinction are clear enough. Parties that
would otherwise consent to a decree would be less likely to do so
with the knowledge that the opposing party could have that decree
easily modified or vacated. For institutional reform and public
interest litigation, however, there is less need to protect the sanc-
tity of agreements. Moreover, a stronger argument can be made
that public institutions are required to function within the con-
straints of current law and current factual circumstances.
The injunction involved in Agostini did not result from private
litigation and falls squarely into the institutional reform/public in-
terest category of cases. 166 Therefore, it follows that the doctrine
of res judicata should have been given less weight in the determi-
nation of whether the injunction should have been vacated. What
,62 Fortin, 692 F.2d at 799.
163 See, e.g., Browder v. Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978); Calumet
Lumber Inc. v. Mid Am. Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1997); Wilson v. Felton, 684
F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1982); Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 382, 386 (5th Cir.
1978). 164 Injunctions are considered final judgments for the purposes of res judicata. See United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); Jost, supra note 20, at 1105. However, some
commentators do not agree that res judicata is appropriate for injunctions. See Doug Rendle-
man, Prospective Remedies in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 155, 163 (1976).
("[B]ecause injunctions guide conduct in a changing future, some observers think resjudicata
inapposite fro injunctions.") (footnote omitted).
165 See 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 60.47[2][c] (3d
ed. 1997) ("[In private litigation] there is a greater concern for the commercial stability that
results from the finality ofjudgments. Particularly when the injunction results from a negotiated
consent decree, finality of judgments and the sanctity of a bargain are strong factors that weigh
against any modification."); see also W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 977 F.2d 558, 562
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (denying modification in commercial consent decree).
166 See Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the Rufo standard applies to institutional reform litigation, and thus to school de-
segregation which falls into that category).
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does not follow, however, is a presumption that res judicata has no
bearing on that determination.
Justice O'Connor was not deterred from disregarding the
doctrine of finality because of equitable consideration of the fman-
cial burden of maintaining the decree until a more suitable proce-
dural vehicle could be found.167  While the economic considera-
tions of the Aguilar injunction were by no means negligible, 168 as
Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent, there were other pro-
ceduraly proper opportunities to reconsider Aguilar awaiting the
court. 16 9 Moreover, Justice O'Connor dismissed the idea that the
cost of compliance was a change in circumstance that did not war-
rant relief under 60(b)(5). 170
E. The Credibility Issue
The Agostini majority used the appeal before it as an opportu-
nity to effectuate a change in the law and in the process disre-
garded the doctrine of finality. In doing so, the Supreme Court
may have damaged its credibility as a "responsive, non-agenda-
setting'' 171 forum. By allowing the New York City Board of Edu-
cation to use Rule 60(b)(5) as a tool to effectuate a change in the
law, the Supreme Court has unwittingly emanated the impression
that procedural rules are no obstacle to achieving the desired out-
come. It appears that the Supreme Court jumped at the opportu-
nity to overrule a decision that did not coincide with either the
views of five of the Court's Justices172 or the majority of legal
commentators. 173 At best, the Agostini decision represents the Su-
preme Court sacrificing procedural stability to the god of equity.
At worst, it represents a Supreme Court taking on the judicial ac-
tivist role that it was chosen to replace.
174
167 Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2018 (1997).
.68 See supra note 98-99 and accompanying text.
169 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Unlike the majority, I find just
cause to await the arrival of Helms, PEARL i, or perhaps another case in which our review
appropriately may be sought ...
170 See id. at 2007.
171 Id. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
j72 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
74 Two Supreme Court cases, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) and
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), are illustrative of the Court's manipulation of proce-
dural issues to accomplish its desired results. In Lyons, the Court held that the Plaintiff, the
victim of police brutality, did not have standing to bring a civil rights action against the City of
Los Angeles. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111. The Plaintiff sought to .enjoin the Los Angeles City
Police Department from using a "choke hold" as an acceptable form of restraint during arrests.
See id. at 98. The Lyons Court held that relief in the federal courts was precluded because the
Plaintiff could not show that the threat of injury to himself was "real and immediate," even if
the Plaintiff introduced evidence of injury to others. See id. at 102. The Court took an unrea-
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F. The Problem of Interpretation for Lower Courts:
Standard of Review
In Agostini, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that the major-
ity should have reviewed the trial court's denial of the Rule
60(b)(5) motion for abuse of discretion. 175  There is substantial
support for her assertion, including a concurring opinion by Justice
O'Connor in Rufo. 176  Justice O'Connor's Rufo opinion, however,
does not deny that the trial court has discretion but states, "[it is
true that the trial court has discretion, but the exercise of discretion
cannot be permitted to stand if we find it rests upon a legal princi-
ple that can no longer be sustained."'
177
The reader is left wondering what, if any, standard of review
O'Connor chose to employ when considering the Agostini appeal.
This is problematic because the District Court was simply follow-
ing the Supreme Court's command in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,178 which expressly forbids lower
courts from preemptively overruling Supreme Court decisions.
179
This, of course, begs the question: how can a trial court abuse its
discretion by following the Supreme Court's instructions prohib-
iting anticipatory overrulings? O'Connor seems to avoid this
paradox by not clearly articulating a standard of review in Agos-
tini. Moreover, she goes to great lengths to affirm the holding of
sonably narrow interpretation of the standing rules to keep the substantive issue out of the fed-
eral courts. In Long, two Michigan police officers stopped an erratically moving car and, after
searching the glove compartment, found marijuana. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1036. The Michigan
Supreme Court upheld the search as valid under its state constitution. See id. Justice O'Connor,
writing for the Court, found that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the matter even though
the case was arguably decided on state law grounds. See id. at 1044. Here, the Court manipu-
lated the jurisdictional element by "fashioning a new presumption of jurisdiction over cases
comini here from state courts." Id. at 1054.
75 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
176 Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393-94 (1992) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Determining what is 'equitable' [under Rule 60(b)(5)] is necessarily a task that
entails substantial discretion, particularly in a case like this one, where the District Court must
make complex decisions requiring the sensitive balancing of a host of factors. As a result, an
appellate court should examine primarily the method in which the District Court exercises its
discretion, not the substantive outcome the District Court reaches. If the District Court takes
into account the relevant considerations (all of which are not likely to suggest the same result)
and accommodates them in a reasonable way, then the District Court's judgment will not be an
abuse of its discretion, regardless of whether an appellate court would have reached the same
outcome in the first instance.") (emphasis added); see also Browder v. Dir., Dept. of Correc-
tions, 434 U.S. 257 (1977) (stating that the review of a denial of a 60(b) motion does not bring
up the underlying judgment for reconsideration)
177 Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018.
17' 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
17 See id. at 484 ("If a precedent of this court has direct application in a case, yet appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to this court the prerogative of overruling its own deci-
sions.") For a general discussion on preemptive overruling, see C. Steven Bradford, Following
Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court's Ill-Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59
FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1990).
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Rodriguez de Quijas so as not to allow the Agostini decision to
overrule it1 80  Apparently, the only way to reconcile the standard
of review with the Rodriguez de Quijas decision is to view Rule
60(b)(5) as the Petitioners in Agostini did.'81 That is, a court is
still bound by the controlling authority of the higher court, but the
function of Rule 60(b)(5) allows the Supreme Court in its appellate
role, deciding as a matter of equity, to modify judgments based on
its own interpretation of intervening law.
While this interpretation leads right back to the problem of
relitigation,182 there is authority for the proposition that the facts of
Agostini call for wider appellate scrutiny, 183 because that decision
did not depend on "first-hand observation or direct contact with
the litigation."'184  Nevertheless, it seems that Agostini did not
change the appellate standard of review for denials of motions un-
der Rule 60(b)(5) because in the view of the majority, the type of
relief required in this case was simply beyond the ken of the dis-
trict or appellate courts.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. A Better Means to the End?
Perhaps the first question that comes to mind upon reading the
Agostini opinion is why the Court did not simply invoke Rule
60(b)(6) as the procedural vehicle to vacate the injunction. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party
from final judgment, order or proceeding for "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgement.' 85  This
broad "catch all" provision was considered unprecedented when it
"0 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2017 ("We do not acknowledge, and we do not hold, that
other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier
precedent.").1d1 See Brief for the Sec. of Educ. at 39-40, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)
(Nos. 96-552, 96-553) ("The lower courts were, of course, bound to follow this Court's directly
controlling precedent, as they recognized. But this Court may nonetheless reconsider and over-
rule Aguilar on review of the lower court's denial of relief under Rule 60(b).").
"a2 See infra Part III(C).
183 See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080-81 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the review
of "structural injunctions"); FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1098 (1978) (arguing that
structural injunctions involve many factors that call for close appellate review, "a federal district
court's exercise of discretion to enjoin state political bodies raises serious questions regarding
the legitimacy of its authority"); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institu-
tional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE LJ. 635, 642-44 (1982) (discussing the
means b' which courts and judges use discretion in decision making).
'Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY LJ. 747, 783 (1982).
185FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(6) (emphasis added).
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was added to the Rules in 1948.186 While there has been some
confusion as to the application of this Rule, 187 courts have gener-
ally agreed that this section is mutually exclusive of the other five
clauses. 88 That is, relief is not available if it would have been at-
tainable under the other provisions of Rule 60(b). 189 Moreover,
relief under 60(b)(6) is determined under the "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" test outlined by the Supreme Court in Klapprott v.
United States.190
If the Court had used 60(b)(6) to dispose of the injunction,
perhaps holding that the heavy financial burden of compliance
justified modification, 191 there would have been no need to torture
Zobrest and Witters into the tools of Aguilar's contrived demise. 1
92
Because the Agostini Court did not address the propriety of Rule
60(b)(6), one can only assume that the Respondent's argument as
to the mutual exclusivity of Rule 60(b)(6) prevailed. 93 However,
both parties addressed the possible use of Rule 60(b)(6) only in
light of the argument that the statements of the five Justices in Kir-
yas Joel could satisfy "extraordinary circumstances" test of Klap-
prott.194 The parties did not address whether the burdensome costs
of compliance with Aguilar could satisfy that test. Thus, the Court
could have vacated the injunction if the cost of complying with
Aguilar created "extraordinary circumstances" and the subsequent
unforeseen financial burden of complying with Aguilar did not
lend itself to relief under the other clauses of Rule 60(b).' 95
What are "extraordinary circumstances" in light of Rule
60(b)(6)? Generally, Rule 60(b)(6) has been narrowly construed
by courts, allowing relief in very limited circumstances. 19 6  For
example, courts have used Rule 60(b)(6) when parties have not
186 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 11 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2864 (2d
ed. 1995).
.i See id.
188 See id.
189 See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862 (1988) (discussing
the process by which Rule 60(b) can be implemented to relieve a party from a final order).
191 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
191 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997,2006 (1997)192 Indeed, the Petitioners asked the court to consider its request under both Rule 60(b)(5)
and 60(b)(6). See Brief for Petitioners at 20, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) (Nos.
96-552f996-553). The Agostini Court did not address the propriety of 60(b)(6).93 See Brief for the Respondent, at 20 n.5, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997)
(Nos. 96-552, 96-553) ("Insofar as petitioners cannot prove a 'significant change in law' under
clause (5), they may not fall back on clause (6) claiming an anticipated change in the law. Rule
60(b)(6) does not enlarge or modify the grounds for relief from a judgment; it merely 'incorpo-
rates generally the substance of the old common law and equitable ancillary remedies."') (cita-
tion omitted).
194 See id.
195 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.196 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 186.
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complied with settlement agreements as well as in situations of
fraud by the moving party's own counsel. 197 The most common
situation in which relief is granted under Rule 60(b)(6), however,
is when the moving party has not received notice of the original
judgement in time to file for appeal. 198
Thus, it seems that the unforeseen subsequent financial bur-
den of an injunction would not at all fit into the traditional grounds
for relief under 60(b)(6). Furthermore, using 60(b)(6) under those
circumstances would not ease the problem of relitigation created
by the Agostini decision. If the Agostini Court had granted relief
under 60(b)(6), however, instead of 60(b)(5), the decision would
not have created tension with Rodriguez de Quijas over the prob-
lem of anticipatory overruling. Moreover, the Court would not
have had to contrive the "erosion" of Aguilar. Thus, the Agostini
Court could have simply waited to overrule Aguilar at a more pro-
cedurally appropriate time without any continued burden on New
York City Board of Education's treasury.
199
Even if the use of Rule 60(b)(6) would have limited the prob-
lems resulting from the Agostini Court's use of 60(b)(5), the Agos-
tini Court still could not insulate itself from the charge of judicial
activism. 200 To be sure, the less damaging 60(b)(6) decision would
have resulted in an unprecedented use of that Rule as well. But the
type of activism employed in fashioning an unprecedented equita-
ble remedy is quite distinguishable from the activism of refash-
ioning constitutional jurisprudence by artificially "eroding" a con-
trolling case with subsequent decisions tenuously connected to that
case.201 Judge William Wayne Justice has distinguished these two
types of activism as "jurisprudential activism" and "remedial ac-
tivism.,' 202 Judge Justice describes "jurisprudential activism" as
"decisions whereby judicial precedents or statutory schemes are
overturned based upon the constitutional values determined by the
judges considering the case.', 203 He defines "remedial activism" as
"expansive remedies imposed and monitored by federal district
courts pursuant to evidentiary showings of constitutional in-
197 See i at 353.
198 See id
199 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2006 (1997).200 See id at 2026.
201 One could argue that the precedential value of a 60(b)(6) decision would be less
authoritative because of the purely equitable nature of the rationale. For a discussion of the
distinction between equity and law, see infra note 208 and accompanying text.
m William NV. Justice, The Two Faces of JudicialActivism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 2
(1992)iO3 Id.
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jury. 20 4 While the Agostini decision, as it stands, seems to fall
squarely in the "jurisprudential activism" category, a ruling under
60(b)(6) would have been analogous to a "remedial activist" deci-
sion; less politically charged, with weaker precedential value, but
most importantly, more credible.
The above discussion is, of course, academic at this point, as
the Agostini Court vacated the injunction solely under Rule
60(b)(5). Thus, the final inquiry involves assessing the place Ag-
ostini will hold precedentially, as well as determining ways to
minimize any of its possible negative impacts.
B. Toward a Narrow Interpretation
It may be difficult not to view Agostini as yet another case, in
the long line of decisions since Swift, lessening the test for modifi-
cation of prospective judgments. However, that is not necessarily
the best way to read the majority opinion. Agostini did not in fact
change the flexible standard of Rufo, but instead added an un-
precedented backdoor to reach the test.
Perhaps the best way to interpret Agostini is as Justice Gins-
burg did: an aberration.20 5 There is, however, the possibility that
Agostini sets a dangerous precedent and weakens several civil
rights and school desegregation consent decrees. The current
Court has a decidedly different view towards affirmative action
programs than the Supreme Court did at the time many of those
decrees were entered into.20 6 Perhaps the best way to reduce this
threat as well as the threat of increased litigation, is to interpret
Agostini as narrowly as possible, that is, only within the context of
civil litigation 207 and only within institutional reform litigation.
Certainly, if Agostini is read to encompass private consent decrees,
the sanctity of the parties' agreement would be greatly compro-
mised.20 8
Justice O'Connor and Justice Ginsburg both viewed this use
of Rule 60(b)(5) as aberrational.20 9 It is difficult, however, to
204 id.
205 See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2026 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
206 See, e.g., Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (raising the level of scrutiny applied
to affirmative action programs).
207 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018.
208 See Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 979 F.2d 1141, 1148-49 (6th Cir. 1992).
"9 See Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018, 2026 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I therefore antici-
pate that the extraordinary action taken in this case will remain aberrational."). The notion that
a decision decided on equitable principles has little or no precedential value is, of course, part
of the foundation of the classic distinction between law and equity. See G. HEGEL, PHI-
LOSOPHY OF RIGHT 142 (T.M. Knox trans., Clarendon Press 1952) ("A court of equity, how-
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imagine that this decision will not become a tool in the litigator's
belt, and not without a bona fide belief in its legitimacy.210 Thus,
it appears that the Supreme Court has added a new interpretation to
Rule 60(b)(5) whether it intended to or not. As Justice Holmes
stated in his oft cited dissent in Lochner v. New York,2 1 1 "[e]very
opinion tends to become a law. 212
CONCLUSION
The over-solicitous may argue that Agostini will open the
floodgates of litigation by allowing a new form of attack upon the
doctrine of res judicata.213 Whether unsuccessful litigants come
forward with 60(b)(5) motions in hand every time "any public
statement by a Justice-whether in a dissenting opinion, an opin-
ion attached to a denial of certiori, or even a speech or article
214
creates the impression that a Supreme Court decision should be
reconsidered, remains to be seen. Perhaps even more damaging
than open floodgates, is the small crack in the dike of the Court's
credibility that has resulted from Agostini. The Court's blatant dis-
regard for the letter and spirit of Rule 60(b)(5) may certainly have
damaged the "integrity in the interpretation of procedural rules,
[and] preservation of the responsive, non-agenda-setting character
of this Court. 215
MICHAEL R. TUCCIt
ever, comes to mean a court which decides in a single case without insisting on the formalities
of a legal process .... Further, it decides on the merits of the single case as a unique one, not
with a view to disposing of it in such a way as to create a binding legal precedent for the fu-
ture."). This distinction is muddied because of the merger of equity and law. Whether Agostini
remains exceptional is difficult to predict.210 SeeAgostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2018 ("Rule 60(b)(5) specifically contemplates the grant of
relief in the circumstances presented here...211 198 U.S. 45(1905).212 Id. at 76.
213 See Brief for Respondents at 23, Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997) (Nos. 96-
552,96-553)
214 Id.2
s Agostini, 117 S. Ct. at 2028 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
t This Note is dedicated to my wife Kar, whose limitless love and support have made all
my dreams possible. I would like to thank Professor Ted Mearns for his wisdom and guidance,
and my family for all of their support and encouragement.
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